无证书的公钥密码学(CL-PKC ) 能在基于身份的公钥密码学(ID-PKC ) 在公钥基础结构(PKI ) 并且关键附带条件契约解决证书管理的问题。在 CL-PKC,关键产生中心(KGC ) 不知道所有用户的私人钥匙,并且他们的公钥不必被证明权威(CA ) 认证。然而,目前,很无证书的加密计划基于不在量环境是安全的大整数因式分解和分离对数,计算复杂性高。解决这些问题,我们基于格子建议一个新证书更少加密计划,更精确,使用与错误(LWE ) 学习的坚硬问题。与计划相比基于大整数因式分解和分离对数,大多数操作在我们的计划是 matrixvector 增加和内部产品,我们的途径有更低的计算复杂性。我们的计划能被证明是选择的 indistinguishability 密文攻击(IND-CPA ) 在随机的神谕模型固定。
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL- PKC) can solve the problems of certificate management in a public key infrastructure (PKI) and of key escrows in identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). In CL- PKC, the key generation center (KGC) does not know the private keys of all users, and their public keys need not be cer- tificated by certification authority (CA). At present, however, most certificateless encryption schemes are based on large in- teger factorization and discrete logarithms that are not secure in a quantum environment and the computation complexity is high. To solve these problems, we propose a new certificate- less encryption scheme based on lattices, more precisely, us- ing the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem. Compared with schemes based on large integer factoriza- tion and discrete logarithms, the most operations are matrix- vector multiplication and inner products in our scheme, our approach has lower computation complexity. Our scheme can be proven to be indistinguishability chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CPA) secure in the random oracle model.