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中文摘要：
在物流服务需求不确定的环境下,利用期权和博弈论,研究了物流服务供应链成员的最优决策和供应链协调问题。引入看涨期权和看跌期权,建立了Stackelberg主从博弈下供应商和集成商的决策模型,得出集成商的最优订购量决策和供应商的最优期权定价决策。研究结果表明,期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型的情况,供应商通过调节利益分配参数能有效协调供应链的利益分配。通过数值分析进一步验证了该协调机制的有效性。
英文摘要：
Under the condition of logistics service demand uncertainty, the optimal decision of logistics service supply chain＇s members and the coordination problem of supply chain were researched. By introducing the call option and the put option, the decision model of supplier and provider under Stackelberg leader-follower game was constructed. Thus the optimal order decision of provider and the optimal option pricing decision were obtained. The research results showed that the profits of supply chain and its members under the option mechanism was better than that in the newsvendor models, and the logistics service provider could coordinate the profits effectively by adjusting profit sharing parameter in terms of demand volatility. A numerical example was further given to confirm the effectiveness of the option on the decision-maker strategy.
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