中文摘要：

考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计问题,将可靠性服从随机分布的供应商作为主供应商,将完全中断供应商作为次供应商,建立以利润最大化为目标的签约和执行两阶段博弈的动态规划模型,得到制造商的最优契约设计。制造商根据产品零售价格的变化灵活做出只与一个供应商签约、与两个供应商同时签约或都不签约的决定,供应商根据契约设计内容决定自己的最优生产规模。研究表明：供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关,与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关;次供应商的订货量与其本身的可靠性呈正相关,与主供应商的可靠性呈负相关;供应商的固定支付与其相应的可靠性呈负相关。

英文摘要：

This paper considers contracts designing for a two-stage chain consisting of a manufacturer and two suppliers.We treat the supplier of whose reliability obedient to random distribution as a main supplier,and treat the supplier of zero or all as a secondary supplier.Based on the profit maximization as the goal,establishing a dynamic programming model of a two-stage game-signing contracts stage and execution stage,we get the manufacturer＇s optimal contract design.The manufacture makes a decision of signing contracts with only one supplier,both suppliers or neither according to the retail price of products,and the suppliers decide the optimal production scale based on the content of contracts.The research indicates that the optimal production scale shows as a negative correlation with per unit of the cost of production,and a positive correlation with per unit of variable payment and punishment cost.The order quantity of the secondary supplier presents apositive correlation with its own reliability,and a negative correlation with the reliability of the main supplier.The mixed payment has a negative correlation with its corresponding reliability.