中文摘要：

修正决策者是完全自利的假设,将利他偏好纳入企业效用函数的构建,基于制造商和供应商间的Stackelberg博弈分析,考察利他偏好对双边努力行为以及供应链运作绩效的影响。研究结果表明：①企业的合作努力行为受自身的利他偏好影响,而生产努力行为受对方的利他偏好影响;②企业利他偏好的存在不仅能提高对方的效用,同时也能提高自身的效用;③相比于占主导地位的下游制造商,上游供应商的利他偏好对提高供应链整体效用的作用更大;④当制造商和供应商的利他偏好水平同时增大时,供应链整体效用能够得到最大程度的提高。

英文摘要：

We reconstruct the utility function of the supply chain node enterprises based on altruistic preference,abandoning the traditional assumption of rationally self-interest actors.We use the Stackelberg game model to investigate how the altruistic preference of the node enterprises affects the bilateral efforts and the supply chain operations.The results show that：①the opposing party＇s altruistic preference affects the production effort of the node enterprises, while his own altruistic preference affects collaboration effort of the node enterprises;②one of the node enterprises＇ altruistic preference could improve his and the other＇s utility;③compared to the downstream manufacturer,the upstream supplier＇s altruistic preference is more conducive to improve the whole supply chain＇s utility;④when both of the node enterprises have a higher level of altruistic preference,the whole supply chain＇s utility can be maximized.