转轨经济国家的法制环境存在显著的地区差异,这造成部分地区法律层面的强制性纠偏机制无法有效发挥约束上市公司盈余管理的作用,此时市场会派生出替代性纠偏机制来弥补法律保护不足的缺陷。以2009-2013年沪深两市6266个观察样本为研究对象,实证研究了媒体监督和法治水平对上市公司盈余管理的治理作用,检验了媒体监督在薄弱的法治环境中发挥的替代效应,揭示了这种替代效应在不同产权性质情况下存在的差异。研究发现:媒体监督可以有效的制约上市公司盈余管理行为;法治水平的提高可以降低上市公司的盈余管理程度;媒体监督是约束上市公司盈余管理有效的法律外替代机制,较强的媒体监督可以有效的降低由于法治薄弱而诱发的盈余管理;基于产权性质的探索性研究表明,相对于法治水平较高的地区而言,在法治水平较低的地区媒体监督对国有企业盈余管理的约束力大于非国有企业。
There exist significant regional differences in the legal environment of transitional economies and in some regions the mandato- ry rectification mechanism at legal level is not effective enough to constrain listed companies' earnings management behaviors, so an al- ternative rectification mechanism often appears in the market to reinforce the inadequate legal protection from law. Using data of compa- nies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the period 2009-2013, a total of 6266 observations, as a research object, we empirically test the governance effect of media supervision and law on the earnings management of listed companies, examine the substi- tution effect of media supervision in weak legal environment, which reveals that, this substitution effect differs under different ownership nature. Results show that media supervision can effectively restrict listed companies' earnings management behavior. Rule of law can re- duce the level of listed companies' earnings management. Media supervision is an effective non-legal alternative mechanism for restrai- ning listed companies' earnings management behavior, i.e., strong media supervision can effectively reduce the earnings management behaviors induced due to weak legal environment. Based on the exploratory study of the ownership nature, from the perspective of the re- gions with relatively high levels of the rule of law, the study shows that in regions with low levels of the rule of law, media supervision is more effective in restraining earnings management of SOEs than that of non-SOEs.