中文摘要：

研究在弹性需求和易变质物品条件下，当供应商和零售商独自决策时，供应商如何确定最优数量折扣问题。基于Stackelberg博奕建立了数学模型，证明了零售商的出售价格随供应商出售价格的降低而降低，从而需求量增大。当供应商给予价格折扣时，零售商的利润是增加的。在此基础上，给出了最优数量折扣的计算方法。对供应商和零售商单独决策时，供应商利用数量折扣对供应链进行协调产生的系统利润与供应商和零售商联合决策时的系统利润做了数值分析和比较。结果表明，供应商采用数量折扣的方法使供应链协调是有效的；价格折扣随价格敏感系数的增大而增大，随变质率的增大而减小。

英文摘要：

Quantity discounts used as a coordination mechanism to achieve the profitability and cost effective of supply chain has been studied for years, but the. discounts of easy-deteriorated items have been paid little attention to. The problem was studied of how a supplier develops an optimal discount pricing structure for easy-deteriorated items with price-sensitive demand when the supplier and the buyer make their decisions independently. On the basis of Stackelberg game, a mathematical model was built, in which a supplier acted as the leader by announcing his pricing policy to the buyer in advance and the buyer did as the follower by determining his unit selling price and the sales volume per unit time was determined. It was shown that when the supplier determined the quantity discounts, the supplier and the buyer＇s profit increased. The sensitivity was analyzed through numerical examples. The results show that quantity discounts increase as the price-sensitive parameter increases and decrease as deterioration rate increase. The profit gained when the supplier and buyer work independently was compared with the profit when they work jointly, showing that the quantity discounts are effective.