文章以1996—2005年在沪、深两市上市的A股IPO作为样本,研究了锁定制度对机构投资者交易行为的影响。实证检验结果表明,机构投资力量的存在加剧了IPO上市初期的价格波动,而锁定制度能有效抑制机构投资者对新股的炒作,从而有利于IPO价格的稳定。但在锁定期结束时,机构投资者会集中抛售其所持IPO股份,并对IPO价格和成交量形成短期冲击。这表明锁定制度并未达到培育机构投资者长期投资理念的目的。
Using the data from IPOs issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen a share markets from 1996 to 2005, this paper studies the effects of lockup regulation on the institutional investors' behaviors. The empirical tests indicate that the institutional investors exacerbated the IPOs' price fluctuation, but the lockup regulation restrained their speculations effectively and rebound to stabilize IPOs price. At the expiration of lockup, the institutional investors sold their IPOs shares intensively which impacted IPOs' price and trading volume temporarily. It shows that lockup regulation did not attain its object, that is, the institutional investors did not hold their IPO shares chronically.