中文摘要：

构建了一个模型，讨论非有效的股票市场对上市公司控股股东或管理层过度融资与短期实业投机行为的影响．并针对具体因素采用比较静态的方法，分析非有效市场对管理层投机程度的影响及其经济意义．发现：公司管理层会在真实内在价值的实业投资和短期投机之间权衡．1）当实业投资回报比较高时，即使市场非有效程度比较高，公司管理层也不会采取投机活动；当实业竞争激烈，收益相对于投机过低时，会选择短期投机．2）当多余的融资大到某种程度时，会影响公司管理者投资行为，他们会花一部分功夫去“迎合”外部投资者，而且在“迎合”上所下的功夫随着多余的融资的增大而增大．

英文摘要：

The paper presents a model in an inefficient market to analyze its effect on executive speculation and financing. Then, according to the comparative statics results, the paper interprets how these factors influ- ence the choice between speculation and normal investment. The conclusions find that in an economy where the return of normal investment is very high, the executives will not speculate no matter how inefficient the market is. Further extra financing can affect the behavior of the executive, when it＇ s too much than enough, and it can make the executive cater to outside investors, and the degree of this behavior increases with the a- mount of extra financing.