中文摘要：

针对干扰事件下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链系统,建立制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,首先分析了数量折扣契约对闭环供应链的协调作用,然后分析了数量折扣契约应对干扰事件的协调作用。结果表明,当干扰事件引起市场规模、再制造成本、回收努力同时扰动时,原契约具有一定鲁棒性;当扰动超出一定范围时,原有的协调被打破;为此,给出改进的数量折扣契约具有抗干扰事件性,并讨论闭环供应链成员的最优利润分配策略,最后通过数值实验来验证结论的有效性。

英文摘要：

Under the disruption event environment,this paper studied the system of closed-loop supply chain composed the single manufacturer and the single retailer.It established a Stackelberg game model as the supplier was the leader,analyzed the coordination with quantity discount contract firstly.Then,it studied the coordination with quantity discount contract under disruptions.It proved that,the original contracts had certain robustness under a small disruption when disrupted the market scale,remanufacturing cost and collection effort simultaneously.But the coordination might be broken off when the disruptions exceeded a certain range,and adjusted quantity discount contract was proposed which had anti-disruption event ability.It also analyzed the distribution strategy of profit among the entities.Finally,it gave a numerical example to the conclusions efficiency.