中文摘要：

供应链中存在着广泛的信息共享,既包括上下游企业间的纵向性共享,也包括同层企业间的横向信息共享。以一个具有学习效应的供应链为研究对象,为研究信息共享对分散型供应链中零售商决策的影响,提出了一个具有横向信息共享的供应链模型。以Cournot博弈为研究手段,求解了零售商的均衡订货决策和信息共享策略。在此模型中,生产商为多个零售商提供类似的产品,每个零售商具有自己独立的终端市场。零售商面对单周期需求,该需求可以在本周期内满足或者在第二阶段延迟交货。由于学习效应的存在,第二阶段生产商的批发价格是第一阶段总订货量的减函数。零售商在观察到自身的需求之前,达成信息共享的协议。研究结果表明,当第一阶段的均衡订货数量低于需求时,零售商间无共享私有信息的动机,该结果和寡头模型信息共享的相关结果相反。除此之外,在一个总体需求稳定的市场中,信息共享的影响随着零售商数量的增加而递减。此结果对企业在不同市场情况下选择信息共享策略具有重要价值。

英文摘要：

There exist both vertical and horizontal information sharing in supply chains.Based on a supply chain with learning effect,to study the impact of information sharing across decentralized retailers in a supply chain,a supply chain model with horizontal information is proposed.By constructing a Cournot competition model,we solve equilibrium order quantity and information sharing strategy for retailers.In this model,the manufacturer supplies similar products to multiple retailers and each retailer serves its independent end market.Retailers face one period of demand and can satisfy the demand by ordering in the first period or back-ordering some of the demand and satisfying it in the second period.Because of the learning effect in the manufacturer side,the wholesale price in the second period decreases in the total order size,across the retailers,in the first period.Retailers should agree on information sharing before they observe demand.We show that retailers have no incentives to share information about their private values when equilibrium order quantities are interior,i.e.,the order size is between zero and the demand.This result is contrary to the result in oligopoly models on information sharing.In addition,we show that the impact of information sharing decreases when there are more retailers.This result is valuable for companies to choose strategy of information sharing.