中文摘要：

地方政府从地区利益出发有使用所得税优惠保护本地企业的动机和能力，本文利用来自中国上市公司的经验证据．探讨地方政府市场分割策略对企业所得税优惠的影响。实证研究发现。地区市场分割越严重，本地企业越有可能享受所得税税率优惠．企业适用所得税税率和实际所得税税率越低。这说明地方政府的确在通过所得税优惠保护本地企业，并且市场分割越严重保护力度越大。本研究还发现民营企业的适用所得税税率显著高于国有企业。而实际所得税税率却显著低于国有企业．说明民营企业的避税动机和能力更强。本文建议适当降低地方政府在企业所得税优惠方面的自由度．在所得税优惠政策上公平地对待不同类型和地区的企业．并加强市场分割严重地区的所得税征管．以期为中国企业营造更为公平的竞争环境。

英文摘要：

To seek regional benefits, local governments have both incentive and capability to protect local firms by reducing the income tax. Based on empirical evidence from Chinese listed firms, this article examines the effects of market segmentation on firm income tax rate. The empirical results show that the more severe of market segmentation, the more hkely that local firms enjoy preferential income tax rate, and the lower firms＇ applicable tax rate and effective tax rate, suggesting that local governments indeed protect local finns through preferential income tax. In addition, we find that the applicable tax rate is higher, but the effective tax rate is lower in private firms than in state-owned firms, indicating that private firms have more incentive and capability in tax avoidance. Based on the above results, this article suggests that local governments should be given less freedom in deciding preferential tax, strengthens tax supervision of regions with high market segmentation and equally treats private and state-owned firms, thus creating a fairer competition environment for firms in all regions.