本文研究了银行风险上限控制下,供应链订单融资模式的最优运作策略,分析了银行风险上限对供应商和零售商最优决策的影响。研究表明银行风险上限等价于银行贷款上限,且随着零售商预订量的增加,银行设置的贷款上限会提高;通过银行上调风险上限或零售商提高预订量,供应商可以实现经典最优生产量;零售商提供预订订单来自于两种动机,即增加销售动机和增加贷款动机,在一定条件下这两种动机可以相互转化。最后,通过数值分析验证了文章的结论。研究结论能为银行设计合适的订单融资产品以及企业选择合适的银行申请订单融资服务提供指导。
In this paper, the optimal operational strategies in preorder financing model of a supply chain under the bank's risk limit are studied. The impact of the bank's risk limit on the supplier and the retailer' s optimal decisions are analyzed. It is shown that the bank's risk limit equals to the loan limit, and the bank's loan limit is increasing in the retailer's preordering quantity. There are two ways to realize the supplier's classical optimal production quantity, one is increasing the bank's risk limit and the other is en- hancing the retailer's preordering quantity. It is also found that the retailer has two incentives to offer pre- orders: one is increasing sales for himself and the other is enhancing loan limit for the supplier. These two incentives can be transformed into each other under certain conditions. Finally, a numerical study is given to demonstrate the conclusions. These results can be used as the reference of banks when designing proper preorder financing products and reference of enterprises when choosing proper banks for applying for pre- ordering financing services.