中文摘要：

笔者运用委托代理理论，引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人，对供应链激励协调与效率进行分析。研究发现：尽管事前决策存在风险，但供销双方从自身利益最大化出发，都有动力寻求最优的α和β组合，使得供应链实现协调，即使无法达成协调的目标，为了在事后得到更多的利益，不仅供应商有积极性降低生产成本，而且销售商也愿意与生产成本低的供应商构建合作伙伴关系。

英文摘要：

To solve the problem of no coordination body and inefficiency caused by bilateral asymmetric information in supply chain, the virtual-third party is introduced to be the principal without its own profit based on the principal-agent theory. And then the incentives coordination model is established to analyze the efficiency of the supply chain. The results show that, although there is the pre-decision risk, both of the supplier and retailer would like to seek the best combination of revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing proportion, to maximize their own interests and then realize the supply chain coordination. Even if sometimes it is unable to reach coordination, not only the supplier is motivated to reduce production costs, but also the seller is willing to cooperate with the supplier with low production costs , to get more ex post benefits.