中文摘要：

公共财产语境下的腐败是官员将公共权力支配下的公共财产非法挪为私用的行为,而作为管理公共财产的法律,财税法着眼于公共财产的收入、支出和监管全过程,进而为控制公共权力提供抓手,是反腐败诸多思路中共识较大、阻力较小、可行性较高的优选路径。基于对财税法反腐内在机理的分析,本文利用中国1995~2010年省域面板数据,实证检验了财税法制建设在中国的反腐败成效。研究结果表明,增加财税立法数量能够显著减少腐败发生率,预算外收入增加和不规范财政分权度提高是导致腐败蔓延的重要原因;增加公务员工资对反腐败发挥了积极作用,而人力资本和政府规模对腐败没有显著影响;分组回归差异性检验进一步揭示了财税法治对腐败的抑制作用具有地区差异的特点。

英文摘要：

Under the public property context, corruption is that officials take public property illegally for private use. As the administrative public property law, fiscal and taxation laws focus on the whole process of public property income and expenditure and regulation, and provide gripper for the public power controlling. In many anti-corruption thought, fiscal and taxation laws are the optimal paths of larger consensus, less resistance and higher feasibility. Based on the analysis of the internal anti-corruption mechanism of fiscal and taxation laws, using 1995-2010 provincial panel data,this paper explores the effect of anti-corruption strategy from the perspective of fiscal legal construction. It is found that improvement in fiscal legislation significantly reduces the incidence of corruption. Increasing in extra-budgetary revenues and non-standard fiscal decentralization are the important cause leading to the spread of corruption. Increasing the wages of civil servants does play a role in reducing corruption. Human capital and the size of government have no significant influence on corruption. Grouping regression difference test reveals further that the effect of fiscal and taxation laws on anti-corruption has the characteristics of regional differences.