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中文摘要：
研究了销售单一产品给单个销售商的制造商在不对称的需求信息情形下，如何通过量折扣手段采进行供应链协调定价的问题．根据制造商-Stackelberg对策结构（即制造商向销售商宣布量折扣计划，然后销售商确定销售价格和相应的订货量），对该问题进行了分析，并为制造商提供了能更好地改善渠道效率的量折扣策略．数字实验结果表明：1）所提出的策略能够将整个渠道效率提高到接近100％；2）该策略不仅能提高制造商的利润，而且也能提高销售商的利润．
英文摘要：
This paper considers the problem of how one manufacturer who sells a single product to one retailer determines a quantity-discount scheme to coordinate two partners＇ pricing under a situation with asymmetric demand information. Based on a Manufacturer-Stackelberg game structure in which the manufacturer declares his quantity-discount scheme to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting his retail price and associated quantity. We analyze the proposed problem and provide the manufacturer with a quantity-discount pricing policy that can make channel efficiency better. The results of numerical experiments show that： 1 ）the proposed policy can improve channel efficiency closely to 100%; 2） it not only makes the manufacturer＇s profit better but also enhances the retailer＇s profit.
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