中文摘要：

自2006年以来，我国上市公司推出的股权激励计划都是业绩型股权激励。我们发现，这些股权激励计划的行权业绩条件主要集中在加权平均净资产收益率和净利润增长率两项会计业绩指标上，且对它们所要求的业绩水平分别集中在“10％”和“20％”上，形成了有趣的“10％／20％”现象。本文通过将行权业绩条件与推出股权激励计划公司自身往期、所在行业往期以及推出计划前分析师盈利预测等进行比较后发现，“10％／20％”并非推出股权激励计划公司盈利能力的真实期望和合理反映，而是从众效应之结果。本文还发现，这一从众效应与证监会的股权激励计划备案制及对股权再融资等的长期监管存在一定关联。

英文摘要：

This paper investigates the performance-vesting conditions in the equity incentive plans of China＇s A-Share listed companies. We find that most plans link vesting to ROE （return on equity） and NIG （growth rate of net income） restrictions, and interestingly, the required level of ROE （NIG） generally is 10% （20%）. We compare them with the past performance of the companies and the industries, and the analysts＇ earnings forecasting, and the results show that there are significant differences between the performance-vesting conditions and the latter. As a result, the ＂10%/20%＂ phenomenon arise form herd effect, and the performance-vesting conditions of these plans do not reflect the real profitability of those companies. We also suggest that the phenomenon is related to the Examine-and-Approve system of the CSRC to some extent.