中文摘要：

已有的基金经理激励机制研究多假定激励对象的心理和需求是同质的,忽视了对基金经理异质性特征的分析。这与实际的经济活动并不相符合。本文通过建立数学模型,将心理契约理论引入基金经理激励问题研究。结果表明,在信息对称条件下,即基金经理的不同心理需求能够被辨别时,应依据其心理契约类型,分类设计激励机制;在信息非对称条件下,即基金经理的不同心理需求无法被辨别时,应依据基金经理特征,如风险厌恶程度、工作成本、投资能力,及其所管理基金的风险大小和外部市场环境的变化方向,分类设计激励机制。并且,在多代理人环境下,基金经理间的合作程度也将对激励机制设计产生影响。本研究不仅是对已有基金经理激励机制研究的拓展与完善,使之更接近现实,也从心理契约视角为解决基金经理激励问题提供了新思路。

英文摘要：

This paper applies the psychological contract theory to resolve the money managers＇ incentives problem.By setting up the principle-agent model,firstly,the paper classifies the incentive mechanism about money managers according to the money managers＇ psychological contract under the symmetric information condition;Secondly,under the asymmetric information condition,the paper researches the classification of incentive mechanism about money managers according to their external feature,such as the risk preference,the cost of the job,the ability of investment and the risk of the fund,and the vary direction of the market environment;Finally,by extending to muti-agent,the paper reviews the impact of the cooperation of money managers on their incentive mechanisms.This research not only makes up the standard principle-agent theory,but also provides new ideas for motivation system design of money managers.