中文摘要：

本文以中国上市公司治理指数（CCGINK）作为反映上市金融机构治理状况的指标，利用面板回归方法，分析了2007—2011年我国上市金融机构公司治理状况对其风险承担的影响。研究发现上市金融机构治理水平与风险承担呈现负相关关系，公司治理分指数股东治理指数和监事会治理指数与上市金融机构的风险承担也呈负相关关系，从而验证了金融危机公司治理层面的制度动因假说。同时进一步研究了股权集中度、股权制衡度、监事会规模、监事会会议次数和监事持股比例对金融机构风险承担的影响。总体来说，我国上市金融机构治理发挥了有效作用，这也是我国金融机构能够幸免于2008年金融危机的根本原因所在，为进一步提高我国上市金融机构治理水平提出相应的对策建议。

英文摘要：

This paper regards the Chinese listed Corporate Governance Index（CCGINK） as the indicator to reflect listed financial institutions governance, using panel regression method to analyze the impact of the financial institutions governance on their risk taking from 2007 to 2011, and finds governance is negatively correlated with risk taking, Shareholder governance and board of supervi- sors governance are negatively correlated with risk taking, and the hypothesis of institutional moti- vation of corporate governance in financial crisis is verified; this paper further researches the impact of the shareholders governance and hoard of supervisors mechanism on risk taking. Overall, the governance of Chinese listed financial institutions plays an effective role which is the microscopic reason why financial institutions survived financial crisis. Finally, this paper makes suggestions for how to improve the governance level of financial institutions.