中文摘要：

定向增发中涉及的大股东利益补偿问题越来越引起政府监管者的重视,增发定价的高折价率、公允性都会直接关乎大股东的利益补偿。以2012—2015年成功定向增发的上市公司作为研究样本,以发行折价率为研究重点,探究了大股东利益补偿问题对增发上市公司财务指标的影响情况,分析了大股东参与认购定向增发股份与公司绩效的反应。研究发现,发行折价率与公司绩效并非简单的线性关系,发行折价率低于某一临界值时,二者存在负相关关系,而高于该临界值时,二者存在正相关关系。大股东参与认购定向增发股份并非简单的掏空行为与支持行为,大股东支持行为与掏空行为的选取应以大股东利益是否获得合理补偿为依据。

英文摘要：

Government regulators have paid more and more attention to the interest compensation of large shareholders in private placement. The high discount rate and fairness in private placement pricing will be of concern to the interest compensation of large shareholders directly. Taking the listed companies with successful private placement during the years from 2012 to 2015 as the research samples, with the research focus on the discount rate in the issuance, this paper explores the impact of interest compensation of large shareholders upon the financial index of the listed companies in private placement and analyzes the reaction of corporate performance to large shareholders＇ participation in subscribing private placement. The research has found that the dis-count rate of issuance and the corporate performance are not in a simple linear relationship. They both are negatively correlated when the discount rate is lower than the critical value, but positively correlated when the discount rate is higher than the critical value. The large shareholders＇ behavior to participate in subscribing private placement is not a simple tunneling behavior or sup-port behavior. Large shareholders can choose their behavior of tunneling or support, which will depend on whether large share-holder can obtain the reasonable compensation.