中文摘要：

企业在进行人力资源管理外包决策时，首先要考虑外包的内容。运用博弈论中的“委托一代理理论”对企业人力资源管理模块组合外包过程进行分析，根据不同的条件假设构造了3类委托一代理博弈模型，在此基础上分析企业和人力资源公司的选择和行为。通过选择正确的激励方式可以有效地解决人力资源管理外包中的道德风险问题，分析结果可为企业在信息不对称、合约不完备的情况下，签订合理的收益分配合约，同时为我国人力资源管理模块化外包的健康发展提供启示。

英文摘要：

When enterprises carry on outsourcing decisions in the human resource management, the first thing to consider is the contents of outsourcing. The paper uses the theory of principal-agent in game theory to analyze mod- ule combination outsoureing in human resource management and the principal-agent relationship of human resource company. Three kinds of principal-agent game models are constructed according to different conditions. Based on this, the paper analyzes the choice and behavior of enterprises and human resource companies. Through choosing the right incentive method the problem of moral hazard in human resource outsourcing can be effectively solved, and the results analysis can be used to sign the contract under information asymmetric and incomplete contract which can help enterprises reach a reasonable income distribution contract, and at the same time, provide assistance for the healthy development of China＇s human resource management modular outsourcing.