欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
文章结合行为财务的研究成果,基于管理者视角探讨了信念波动在财政刺激与企业过度投资行为之间的中介效应,以及不同特征的企业对财政刺激资金效应与信号效应路径的选择性反应。研究发现,财政刺激政策的实施与退出造成了管理者信念和异质信念的波动,较强的管理者信念和异质信念均加剧了企业的过度投资行为;管理者信念在财政刺激与企业过度投资行为之间存在中介效应,异质信念的中介效应则不明显。进一步研究发现,国有企业、规模较大和破产风险较大的企业对财政刺激所产生的资金冲击的反应更加明显,而民营企业、规模较大和破产风险较小企业的管理者信念的中介效应更加显著。以上结果说明,财政刺激政策同时通过资金效应与信号效应影响企业投资效率,这为完善政策制定、提高施政水平提供了有益的借鉴。
英文摘要：
Combining with the research results of behavioral finance, this paper dis- cusses the intermediary role of belief fluctuations in the relationship between fiscal stimu- lus and enterprise over-investment behavior, and the selective reaction of enterprises with different characteristics between fiscal stimulus funds and signal effect path. It comes to the following conclusions： firstly, the implementation and exit of fiscal stimulus policy lead to the fluctuations of manager and heterogeneous believes and both stronger manager and heterogeneous believes have exacerbated enterprise over-investment behavior; second- ly, manager belief plays an intermediary role in the relationship between fiscal stimulus and enterprise over-investment behavior but the intermediary effect of heterogeneous belief is not significant. Further study shows that, state-owned enterprises, large enterprises and enterprises with higher insolvency risk have more obvious response to money shocks resul- ting from fiscal stimulus. Otherwise, private enterprises, large enterprises and enterprises with lower insolvency risk have more significant response to the intermediary effect of manager belief. Results above-mentioned indicate that fiscal stimulus policy affects enter- prise investment efficiency through money and signal effects at the same time, providing beneficial references for the perfection of policy formulation and the improvement of ad- ministrative governance.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Financial relationships, banking structure and financing constraints: evidence from private enterpri
期刊信息
位置：