文章研究政治周期对企业投资的影响及其现象、作用路径与经济后果。基于2001-2009年277个地级市市长变更所形成的政治周期,文章研究发现:(1)市长变更后第1年和第2年的投资支出及其增长速度均高于变更当年,市长变更后第3年及以后的投资指标均低于变更当年,投资峰值出现在变更后第2年。(2)在这种现象背后,是增加企业负债融资的微观路径与扩大政府支出的宏观路径。两者的变化规律与投资行为基本一致,负债融资和政府支出的峰值都出现在变更后第1年。(3)这种现象导致企业投资效率下降,过度投资增加,过度投资程度与可能性的峰值都出现在变更后第2年。这一研究丰富了中国的政治周期对资源配置影响的相关文献,增进了对地方官员在中国制度中所发挥作用的了解。
This paper studies the effect of political cycle on firm investment,its phenomenon,function mechanism and economic consequences. Using the political cycle resulting from mayors' turnover in 277 prefecture-level cities from 2001 to 2009,it comes to the results as follows:firstly,on the first and second years after mayors' turnover,both investment expenditures and investment growth speeds are higher than the ones on the year of mayors' turnover;on the third year after mayors' turnover and later years,the two investment indexes are lower than the ones on the year of mayors' turnover;and the investment peak appears on the second year after turnover;secondly,the reason for this phenomenon lies in the micro route of the increase in firm debt financing and the macro route of the expansion of government expenditures;their change patterns are basically consistent with investment behavior and the peaks of debt financing and government expenditures appear on the first year after turnover;thirdly,this phenomenon leads to the decrease in firm investment efficiency and the rise in over-investment;the peaks of over-investment degree and probability appear on the second year after turnover. It enriches the literature of the effect of political cycle on resources allocation in China,and promotes the understanding of the role of local officials in Chinese institutions.