欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
基于控制权私利动机驱动资本投资的理论阐释,本文在上市公司实际控制人和部门经理的两层代理框架下,构建了企业内部经营者攫取控制权私利所引致的非效率投资行为模型。模型研究和扩展分析表明：（1）企业生产部门的低效性引发了经营者通过攫取私利增加收益选择权的动机;（2）在国有股权虚置和内部人控制显著的治理结构下,实际控制人和部门经营者私利的一致性、股权激励机制的弱效性以及薪酬管制的制度刚性,使得上市公司实际控制人更多采用融资资金对经营者攫取私利的收益选择权进行补偿,引发了企业的过度投资行为;（3）低效部门经营者的攫取私利动机和实际控制人补偿行为的相互作用,不仅导致了企业投资的效率低下,而且使得投资资金在高效部门和低效部门之间的配置产生挤占。
英文摘要：
Based on the causation of the capital investment driven by the private benefit of control,an inefficient investment behavior model leaded by the insider snatching private benefit of control is constructed under a uniform two-tiered analysis frame.By expanding the model,the investigative results are gained.（1）The branch inefficacy in the corporation drives the motivation that snatches private benefit of control for increasing profitable option;（2）Under the absence of state property right and the prominent insider control in the corporation governance structure,the fact that uses capital by the state proxy to compensate the exterior option of private benefit of control leads to the overinvestment behavior due to the coherence of private benefit between controller and manager,the inefficacy of stock ownership incentive mechanism,and the rigidity of salary management;（3）The mutual effect of the snatching private benefit and compensating behavior causes not only the overinvestment,but also the extrusion effect of capital allocation between the efficient branch and the inefficient branch.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
位置：