中文摘要：

探寻地方官员干预要素市场的动因是治理中国要素市场扭曲的前提,而地方官员对要素市场的干预可能主要源于财政、晋升和寻租等方面的激励。本文基于对现有文献的梳理和归纳,理论上分析了地方官员激励影响要素市场扭曲的机理,并利用中国省级层面面板数据对理论假说加以检验。研究发现：地方官员的财政激励、晋升激励和寻租激励对地区要素市场都产生了显著的扭曲效应,而“入世”后的这种扭曲效应下降了。在不同制度环境中,地方官员激励对要素市场扭曲的影响存在着差异。金融和法律环境的改善以及产权明晰程度的提高,能够在一定程度上规避地方官员激励对要素市场产生的扭曲效应。本文既拓展了官员激励和要素市场扭曲等研究领域,又启发了中国要素市场扭曲的治理方向。

英文摘要：

It is the premise to govern the China＇factor market distortions that exploring the internal reasons of the local officials？intervening in factors market.The motivation which local officials have inter-vened on the factor market may come from financial incentive,promotion incentive and rent-seeking incen-tive. Based on the existing literature,this paper theoretically discusses the mechanism of local officials＇in-centive affecting on factors market distortion. It tests the theoretical hypothesis,using the China＇s provin-cial panel data. The results show that the fiscal incentives,promotion incentives and rent seeking incen-tives have significant effects on the factors market distortion. In different institutional environment,the effects of local officials？incentive on the factor market distortion are different. Moreover,the improvement of financial and legal environment as well as clear property right can avoid the effect of local officials＇in-centive on the factor market distortion in a certain extent. This paper not only expands the research field of officials＇incentive and factor market distortion,but also inspires the direction of governing the factor mar-ket distortion.