研究不公平厌恶对产出和需求均为随机变量的供应链的影响.基于劣势不公平厌恶和优势不公平厌恶两种情况,建立了随机供需下的批发价格模型,求出了零售商在不同情境下的最优订购量,分析了不公平厌恶对零售商的最优订购量和供应链协调性的影响.研究表明,对于公平中性的零售商,批发价契约无法实现供应链的协调,然而当零售商具有极度优势不公平厌恶时,批发价格契约可以提高供应链的整体利润和更好地协调供应链,从而推广了传统的批发价格契约协调供应链的理论和应用.最后,算例验证了理论分析的结果.
The effect of inequity aversion on supply chain with random yield and random demand was studied.Based on disadvantageous inequity aversion and advantageous inequity aversion,a model of wholesale price contract with random yield and random demand was established,the optimal ordering quantity of the retailer in different situations was obtained and the influence of fairness preferences on retailer's optimal ordering quantity and supply chain coordination was analyzed.Finally,numerical examples were presented to illustrate the theoretical results.This research shows that the wholesale price contract can not achieve supply chain coordination for the fair neutral retailer.However,when the retailer has extreme advantageous inequity aversion,the wholesale price contract can improve the profit of the whole supply chain and better coordinate the supply chain,which extends the theory and application of thetraditional wholesale price contract in real life.