中文摘要：

在股权分置改革中，终极控制人性质是影响对价的重要因素，表现为：国有控股的上市公司对价显著地高于私有产权控制的上市公司；而中央政府控制的上市公司对价显著地低于地方政府控制的上市公司。在控制了其他可能影响对价的因素后，该结论依然稳健地存在。由于对价过高反映了大股东的损失，因此，本文的研究结论意味着，股权分置改革中可能存在国有资产流失问题，相对而言，中央政府、国资委对国有资产的监管更富有成效。

英文摘要：

This paper finds that the property of controlling shareholders can affect consideration ratio,such as the consideration ratio of listed companies controlled by the state is signifiantly higher man mat controlled by private shareholders. Furthermore, the consideration ratio of listed companies controlled by center government is significantly lower than that controlled by local government. After restraining other influencial factors, this conclusion stands. As high consideration ratio means the loss of controlling share-holders, this research indicates that state-owned assets lost during the process of split share structure reform, and that comparatively speaking supervision by center government and State Asset Management Bu- reau are effecitive.