中文摘要：

本文针对我国创业板公司IPO后大比例现金分红的现象进行了实证研究,认为对于创业型企业上市后随即大幅现金分红,属于与企业成长性相违背的悖论,论文探讨了其成因和后果。研究发现,企业在IPO时的资金超募比例越高、控股股东持股比例越大,现金股利支付率越高;控股股东减持股票,现金股利支付率并没有降低;股利分配预案公告对公司长期股价产生显著的负向影响。研究证据支持了由代理成本理论出发的股利政策假说。本文的结论是：在新股发行制度尚未完善的背景下,创业板上市公司的控股股东利用超募资金进行大比例的现金分红,损害了中小股东的长远利益。这一结论对于完善新股发行制度及加大中小投资者权益保护具有重要意义,对未来的创业板企业再融资政策制定亦有启示。

英文摘要：

This paper empirically studies the phenomena of generous cash dividends after IPO of Chi Next listed companies. We think it is paradox of dividend policy that Growth companies distribute cash dividends after IPO. We find that cash dividend payout ratio is increased with the over-financing ratio and the actual Controller＇s ownership ratio. Cash dividend payout ratio isn＇t decreased when the controlling shareholders reduces the stock. The announcement of dividend distribution plan has negative impact on long-term stock returns. The proofs prove that the dividend policy can be explained by agency cost theory. The paper shows that Controlling shareholders of the Chi Next listed companies may misappropriate the interests of minority shareholders by cash dividends under the IPO over-funding background.The findings are vital to improve IPO system and enhance the protection of minority shareholder＇s rights. It is also important to make SEO rules of Chi Next listed companies in the future.