中文摘要：

由于成本信息的不对称,企业以价格作为传递创新产品成本类型的信号,并以此影响消费者对未来价格的预期和购买决策。通过引入消费者的策略行为,分别在成本为公有信息和私有信息的情形下,构建企业和消费者的博弈模型,分析成本信息披露如何影响消费者的购买行为,进而影响企业的定价策略和利润。研究发现：当成本为私有信息时,若消费者认为企业为低成本的概率越大或者高低成本企业之间的成本差异越大,高成本企业越倾向于采用高价分离策略,反之则倾向于采用混同定价;成本信息披露会降低企业的预期定价,但会同时增加企业的预期利润和预期消费者剩余;不考虑消费者的策略行为时,企业的定价和利润均会提高。

英文摘要：

Prices often serve as signals of firms~ innovative product cost types due to asymmetric cost information, and thus impact consumers＇ expectation of future prices and purchasing decisions. We construct a game-theoretic model under perfect and imperfect information respectively to study how cost information disclosure affects consumers~ purchasing behavior as well as the firm＇s optimal pricing strategy and profit. It is found that when cost is the firm＇s private information, if the proba- bility of the firm being a low-cost type is high or the difference in costs between the two types of firms is large, the high-cost firm prefers to separate itself from the low-cost firm, otherwise it prefers the pooling pricing strategy. Cost information disclosure will lower the firm＇s expected price but increase both the firm＇s expected profit and the expected consumer surplus. Moreover, when all consumers are non-strategic, the firm will price higher and obtain more profits.