本文主要研究广义特征函数下的合作对策,并定义了广义特征函数下合作对策的τ值,同时讨论了τ值的个体合理性,哑元性和可替代性等性质.并用概率有效性,S均衡下的相对不变性和限制成比例性证明了τ值的存在唯一性.最后,讨论了核心和τ值的关系.特别地,广义特征函数下的合作对策的τ值是经典合作对策的τ值的推广.
In this paper, a new generalization for the τ value of the cooperative game is introduced. The τ value possesses the efficiency property, individual rationality and so on. Then axiomatic characterizations are found for the τ value using probability efficiency, relative invariance under s-equivalence and restricted proportionality property. At last, this paper will discuss the ralationship between the τ value and core for the games of generalized Characteristic functions.