欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
通过构建一个理论模型，分析控制性股东的风险转移和投资不足动机对融资结构与企业投资行为之间关系的影响，并结合我国上市公司数据进行实证检验．研究发现：在投资收益的边际波动为正的情形下，两种动机的抵消作用将抑制融资结构与企业投资规模间的负向关系；而在投资收益的边际波动为负的情形下，两种动机的同向作用加剧融资结构与企业投资规模间的负向关系．同时，这种负向关系还会随着控制性股东的持股比例加大而递增．
英文摘要：
This paper analyzes the effect of both controlling shareholder＇ risking-shifting and under-investment incentive on the relationship between financial structure and corporate investment behavior using a theory model, and gives an empirical analysis using the data of listed corporation. The results are shown as follows： Under positive marginal volatility of investment profit, the reverse action of the two incentives will mitigate the negative relationship between financial structure and corporate investment size; and under negative marginal volatility of investment profit the same action of the two incentives will exacerbate the negative relationship between financial structure and corporate investment. Simultaneously this negative relationship will also increase with increasing of the stock share of controlling-shareholder.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
位置：