中文摘要：

假定市场需求依赖于零售价格和物流服务水平,研究了供应商主导、TPL和零售商跟随的生鲜农产品三级供应链的成本谎报问题。针对无谎报、TPL单边谎报、TPL和零售商双边谎报三种情形,分别建立了序贯非合作博弈模型,给出了谎报下的最优谎报策略并分析了成本谎报对系统成员决策和利润的影响。研究表明：谎报会造成物流服务水平、市场需求和供应商利润减少;单边谎报下零售价格、零售商利润低于无谎报和双边谎报情形,而TPL利润则大于后两种情形;单边谎报下系统利润大于双边谎报情形,而单边和双边谎报下系统利润并非一定低于无谎报的情形。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the cost misreporting in a three - echelon fresh agri - products supply chain with a supplier as the leader, a TPL service provider and a retailer as follower by assuming the market demand depend on the logistics service level and retail price. Considering three situations that the system without misreporting, TPL unilateral misreporting, TPL and retailers bilateral misreporting, it establishes sequential non - cooperative game models respectively. Then, it figures out the optimal misreport strategies in the misreporting situation and analyzes the influence of cost misreporting on decision - making behavior of members and each profit of the system. Research shows misreporting can cause the reduction of the logis- tics service level, market demand and supplier＇s profit; retail price and retailer＇s profit in unilateral misreporting are lower than that in the system without misreporting, whereas the TPL＇s profit is more than that in the latter two cases; the system＇s profit in unilateral misreporting is greater than that in bilateral misreporting, however, the system＇s profit in unilateral misre- porting and bilateral misreporting is not necessarily lower than that in the system without misreporting.