中文摘要：

在考虑网店和实体店并存的情况下,构建了不同联盟模式下制造商、网店和实体店间的博弈模型,对比分析了不同联盟模式中批发价格、网店零售价格、实体店零售价格、市场需求量、网店利润、实体店利润、制造商利润和供应链整体利润的变化趋势;同时证明了基于Shapley值法可以设计出合理的利润分配机制,保证制造商、网店和实体店利润在整体联盟模式中实现Pareto改进。研究结果表明,在缺乏公平的合作机制时,制造商、网店和实体店各自偏好于不同的联盟模式,供应链整体利润不能实现最大化;基于Shapley值法设计的利润分配机制是保障自愿合作,实现供应链整体利润最大化的有效途径。

英文摘要：

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain which consists of a manufacturer,an online store and a physical store. The different alliance game models are used to analyze the change trends of wholesale prices,retail prices and market demands as well as the profits of three parties. The results show that,in the absence of fair cooperation mechanism,three parties prefer to the different alliance modes and the profit of the whole supply chain cannot be optimal. In addition,the analysis also reveals that,the Shapley value method can be used to design the reasonable profit distribution mechanism to ensure Parreto improvements of three parties and achieve the optimal profit of the whole supply chain. The example study also presents how the Shapley value method is applied and shows the effectiveness of the supply chain.