中文摘要：

微观主体怎样才能有效地发挥其抗风险能力一直为人们所关注．已有文献大多从规模经济和范围经济角度对金融控股公司的经营绩效进行了实证研究，但从控制权配置的角度对金融控股公司风险管理机制的研究尚未发现．基于组织设计理论中的控制权分配理论和不完全合约理论，本文构建了金融控股公司风险控制权配置模型，研究了微观主体行为在风险管理中的作用．研究发现：在内部和外部风险冲击下，金融控股公司能够通过分权或集权的风险控制权配置，分散和转移风险，提高其风险控制能力，从而提高收益．本文还选取国际金融危机爆发至今的样本数据，对金融危机冲击下我国金融控股公司与独立银行的收益和风险绩效进行比较．实证结果表明金融控股公司盈利水平显著高于独立银行，其风险水平低于独立银行．此外，本文给出了金融危机冲击对样本公司收益影响的时变效应，验证了金融危机对我国金融业的冲击．

英文摘要：

How the micro-agent effectively exerts its risk control ability has always been a research focus. There are plenty literatures which have made empirical studies concerning the performance of financial holding companies from the viewpoints of both economies of scale and economies of scope. We have found few litera- tures digging into the risk management mechanism of financial holding companies from the perspective of control rights allocation. Based on the control rights allocation theory in organizational design and the incomplete contract theory, we construct a risk control rights allocation model of the financial holding companies and study the functions of the micro-agent＇ s behaviors in risk management. The analysis shows that： when confronted by internal and external risk shocks, the financial holding company could diversify and transfer the risk, enhance the risk control ability and improve the return by decentralizing or centralizing the risk control rights. To validate the above conclusions, we select the sample data of Chinese financial holding companies and individual banks during the financial crisis and make an empirical comparison of their risk and return performances. The empirical results show that the profitability of financial holding companies is significantly higher than that of individual banks;their risk level is lower than that of individual banks. In addition, we study the time-varying effect of the financial crisis on the sample companies, and the results confirm the impact of the financial crisis on China＇s financial sector.