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盈余管理与高管离任:董事长还是财务负责人
  • ISSN号:1007-9556
  • 期刊名称:山西财经大学学报
  • 时间:2012
  • 页码:105-113
  • 分类:F123.1[经济管理—世界经济] F275[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • 相关基金:The research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant no. 71172181 and 71302155), and the Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project.
  • 相关项目:管理会计工具在中国企业集团与子公司管理控制变革中的价值导向研究
中文摘要:

这研究在现金资源和短期的债同时在样品时期上占超过 20% 全部的财产至少二连续的年的中国公司观察并且探索一个难题。这现象与社团的价值最大化的原则冲突,并且不是清楚地在社团的金融由古典理论解释了。在中国在转变经济的机构的限制的现存文学和讨论基于含意,这份报纸开发涉及在最大的股东和债权人和这思索的形成之间的机构冲突的四个假设金融结构。实验分析建议有通道动机的最大的股东寻求保持更多的现金服务他们的私人利息或列出的公司的作为结果的运作的赤字。到目的,这些公司趋于管理预定短学期债资助在年的结束暂时增加现金储备。实质上,这些公司的资产负债表上的更大的现金资源与难题联系了为潜在的债权人成为一个似是而非的信号,可能贡献供这些的短期的债列出了公司下列年。因此,思索金融结构与预定债资助和债权人的不利选择被连接。这研究在现金资源和债成熟上充实文学的溪流,并且在转变经济的上下文在在现金资源和债成熟之间的协会上在最大的股东的机构问题的影响上提供新证据。

英文摘要:

This study observes and explores a puzzle in Chinese firms whereby both cash holdings and short-term debt simultaneously account for more than 20% of total assets for at least two consecutive years over the sample period. This phenomenon conflicts with the principle of corporate value maximization, and is not clearly explained by the classical theories in corporate finance. Based on the implications in the extant literature and discussions of institutional constraints of the transition economy in China, this paper develops four hypotheses that are involved with agency conflicts between the largest shareholders and creditors and the formation of this puzzling financial structure. The empirical analyses suggest that the largest shareholders with tunneling motives seek to hold more cash to serve their private interests and/or the consequent operational deficit of the listed corporations. To the ends, these corporations tend to manage the timing of short term debt financing to increase cash reserves temporarily at the end of year. Essentially, greater cash holdings on the balance sheet of these corporations related with the puzzle become a misleading signal for potential creditors, possibly contributing to the refinancing of short-term debt of these listed firms for the following year. Hence, the puzzling financial structure is connected with the timing of debt financing and adverse selection of creditors. This study enriches the stream of literature on cash holdings and debt maturity, and provides new evidence on the impact of agency problems of the largest shareholders on the association between cash holdings and debt maturity in the context of a transition economy.

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期刊信息
  • 《山西财经大学学报》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:山西财经大学
  • 主办单位:山西财经大学
  • 主编:王培勤
  • 地址:太原市坞城路696号
  • 邮编:030006
  • 邮箱:sxcdxb@263.net
  • 电话:0351-7666806
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1007-9556
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:14-1221/F
  • 邮发代号:22-9
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版),中国北大核心期刊(2000版)
  • 被引量:20837