中文摘要：

政策鼓励和可交换债券的融资、减持功能是推动可交换债券在并购中得以应用的驱动因素。随着可交换债券与企业并购活动的结合日趋紧密，相应地衍生出了一些值得关注的风险：政策的拉动可能诱发管理层在并购交易过程中盲目发行可交换债券；信息披露不足容易影响投资者的价值判断；新晋股东通过发行可交换债券提前退出，会引发投资者对并购整合效果的质疑；同时“定向增发＋可交换债券”的组合可能形成一定的套利空间。为了应对上述风险，本文提出以下建议：监管部门从顶层设计上限制潜在的套利空间，中介机构凭借其专业背景为可交换债券的发行发挥风险过滤功能，企业作为风险防范的主体需要在并购准备、交易和整合阶段合理评估自身实力，理性运用可交换债券。

英文摘要：

This paper indicates that the policy encouragement the financing and stock reduction function of exchangeable bonds （EB） promote the application of EB in the mergers and acquisitions （M＆As）. With the great integration of EB and corporate merger activities, it derives some noteworthy risk accordingly. Specifically, policy encouragement can lead to top managers＇ overconfidence and issuing EB blindly;the lack of information disclosure affects the investors＇ value judgments new shareholders could exit early through the issuance of EB, causing investors to question the integration effect of M＆As; the combination of private placement and EB may form arbitrage. In order to cope with the risks of the application of EB in M＆As, the regulatory authorities should limit the potential arbitrage space by the top-level design. Intermediary institutions should play the risk filtering function in the issue of EB with their professional background. As the main body of risk prevention, enterprises need to assess their own strength and issue EB rationally in the preparation,transaction and integration phase of M＆As