中文摘要：

以独立董事监督和监事监督为经理更换约束条件,引入经理管理防御并分析非单一监督主体模式下独立董事与监事的监督效率,结果表明：当不存在惩罚机制时,拥有信息量的多少是决定监督效率的高低判断标准;当存在惩罚机制时,独立董事和监事趋向做出一致的评价结果,而且信息优势和更少惩罚威胁两种优势集中在一方时,将提高监督效率.经理管理防御行为不仅降低了独立董事和监事获取信息的数量,而且对其福利水平产生影响,使信息优势和更小惩罚威胁优势产生更大的分离,从而可能降低监督效率.

英文摘要：

This article analyzed supervision efficiency of outside directors and supervisor under the managerial entrenchment with manager＇s turnover by the supervision of outside directors and supervisor.The results showed that as follows： when there was no punishment mechanism,the number of information was the level of supervision efficiency;when there is punishment mechanism,outside directors and supervisors tend to make the same evaluation results,and supervision superiority and the threat of punishment were two advantages of less concentrated in the party,which would improve the monitoring efficiency.Managerial Entrenchment not only reduced the information of outside directors and supervisors obtaining but also level of their welfare,so that information superiority and advantages of smaller threat of punishment were derived than before,which might reduce the efficiency of supervision.