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中文摘要：
基于内部人控制和寻租均能导致企业资金配置效率低下的成因阐释，在两层代理框架下构建了国有上市公司部门经营者寻租所导致的扭曲性过度投资行为模型．模型研究和扩展分析表明：1）企业内部生产部门的低效性直接驱动了其经营者的寻租行为；2）在国有股权虚置和内部人控制下，国有代理人采用股权融资资金补偿经营者寻租的外部选择权，引发了企业的过度投资行为；3）经营者寻租和国有代理人补偿行为的相互作用，使得资金在企业高效和低效部门之间的配置产生结构性扭曲，容易形成越低效越寻租，越寻租越过度投资，越过度投资越低效的恶性循环机制，
英文摘要：
For the causation of the capital arranging inefficacy in the state listed companies which is leaded to by insider control and rent-seeking, this paper constructs an overinvestment behavior model leaded to by the insider rent-seeking activity under a uniform two-tiers analysis frame. Through expanding the model, the investigative results are gained as follows. 1） The inefficacy of branch in the corporation drives rent-seeking behavior of the operator; 2）Under the absence of state property and the prominent insider control in the corporation governance structure, using equity capital by the state proxy to compensate the exterior option of rent-seeking leads to the overinvestment behavior; 3）The mutual effect of the rent-seeking and compensating behavior causes the distortization of capital collocating between the efficient branch and the inefficient branch, and results in the malignant circle as follows. The more inefficient the departmental operation is, more severe the rent-seeking degree is ;the more severe the rent-seeking degree the more excessive the investment is ; and the more excessive the investment is, the more inefficient the departmental operation is.
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