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中文摘要：
考虑到龙头企业和合作社间的信息不对称和我国农户日益＂原子化＂的现状,完全依靠外部直接监督合作社农户生产行为的成本是极为高昂的。农户＂搭便车＂行为容易陷入合作社内部的集体行动困境,导致合作社农产品质量供给的低效率。论文在＂行动者/结构＂的分析框架下,尝试将强互惠理论拓展到合作社农产品质量供给治理中,探讨通过强化强互惠行为来重塑合作社结构的可能性,从而实现合作社农产品质量供给的高效率;最后的数值仿真表明强互惠行为的存在确实能有效提高合作社的农产品质量。
英文摘要：
Considering the situation of asymmetric information between the leading enterprise and agricultural cooperatives and the atomization feature of farmers,the cost of supervision of the third party on the agricultural production is extremely high.The ＂free rider＂ phenomenon of farmers would easily cause the dilemma of collective action inside of cooperatives.By using the analytical framework of actor/structure,this paper tries to extend the strong reciprocity theory into the monitoring situation of cooperatives＇ products＇ quality.The author also explore the possibility of rebuilding the structure of cooperatives through enhancing strong reciprocity,so that the high efficient products supply will be realized.In the end,the author uses numerical simulations to prove that strong reciprocity can improve the quality of agricultural product in agricultural cooperatives.
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