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中文摘要：
研究了两种场景下的路由热点博弈:一是用户可以将通信量分割成多块而选择多路由,二是用户在通信量不能分割时选择多路由.提出了一种路由热点博弈的形式化模型,在该模型下分析两种场景下纳什均衡的存在,并研究了两种场景中纳什均衡效率.通过对调和率的分析得出如下结论:两种场景中的调和率均是无边界的,只有当选择的路径中包含最少的热点时,网络才能达到最优的纳什均衡.
英文摘要：
Hotspot game in two scenes was mainly described .In the first scene ,users split their traf-fic over more than one path .In the second scene ,users can not divide the traffic into multi-path .A formal model was proposed .In this model ,the existence of the nash equilibrium in both scenes and the price of anarchy was analyzed .Through the efficiency analysis of Nash equilibrium ,it is concluded that the prices of anarchy are unbounded both in these two scenes ,and network achieve the best nash equilibrium w hile the routing includes the least number of hotspots .
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