中文摘要：

将管理者划分为董事长和总经理两个管理层级,考察不同管理层级过度自信对投资水平的影响。以管理者自愿持股增加作为过度自信的代理变量,通过建立全样本、董事长过度自信、总经理过度自信、二职合一过度自信、董事长和总经理同时过度自信5个样本组,用2010～2014年A股上市公司的数据,分别对5个样本组进行回归。实证结果表明,管理者过度自信对公司投资水平具有正向影响,而且筹资现金流对该影响具有负向调节作用。不同管理者过度自信对投资水平的作用途径有所不同：董事长过度自信在直接调整投资水平的同时,会降低投资对经营现金流的敏感性;总经理的过度自信只影响投资水平,不改变投资对现金流的敏感性。相对于董事长和总经理同时过度自信的管理者而言,二职合一管理者过度自信对投资水平影响更显著。

英文摘要：

In order to test the effect of different managerial levels＇ overconfidence on investment, this study divides managers into two levels, board chairman and CEO. Here managers are classified as being overconfident if they increase the shareholding of employed company voluntarily. Then regres- sion anaysis was conducted on five sample groups respectively, full sample, chairman＇s overconfi- dence sample, CEO＇s overconfidence sample, chairman cum CEO＇s overconfidence sample, chairman and CEO simultaneous overconfidence sample, using A-share listed company data of 2010 to 2014. The empirical results show that managerial overconfidence impact on investment positively, but the fi- nancing cash flow can reduce the impact. Further research found that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be reduced by chairman＇s overconfidence; CEO＇s overconfidence only affect investment level, without changing the investment sensitivity to cash flow. With respect to the chairman and gen- eral manager simultaneous overconfidence, the impact of one person holding two posts at the same time is more significant.