欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
投融资平台是中国地方政府的重要融资工具．在假设投融资平台风险中性、银行风险厌恶的条件下，建立数学模型从理论上研究政府担保对投融资平台融资行为的影响机理，并以此为基础对投融资平台的过度举债融资行为以及地方政府隐性债务风险和银行业信贷风险不断加剧的现象进行合理解释．研究结果表明：中国地方政府投融资平台在政府信用担保和土地抵押条件下都会产生向银行无限贷款的动机；在一定条件下，投融资平台和银行之间的均衡贷款数量将随着贷款利率、政府信用担保履约率或抵押土地保值率的增加而增加．
英文摘要：
The investment and financing platform is the important financing tool of China＇s local government. This paper sets up a mathematical model to research the effect mechanisms of government guarantee on financ- ing behaviors of the investment and financing platform of China＇s local government （IFPCLG） theoretically by assuming that the IFPCLG is risk neutral and banks are risk aversion, and reasonably explains the excessive debt financing behavior of IFPCLG and the phenomenon that the implicit debt risk of China＇s local government and China＇s banking credit risk are ever-increasing on the basis of the theoretical model. The main research results show that the IFPCLG is motivated to loan unrestrictedly with either the government credit guarantee or mortgage on land, and the equilibrium loan amount between IFPCLG and banks will increase with the loan rate, the agreement fulfill rate of the government credit guarantee or the maintenance value rate of mortgage land under certain conditions.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Financial relationships, banking structure and financing constraints: evidence from private enterpri
期刊信息
位置：