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中文摘要：
制造业服务化战略实施过程势必会产生供需双方的交互,但因供需双方掌握信息不对称性会产生知识缺口.在制造业服务化过程中知识缺口形成原因分析的基础上,利用演化博弈分析方法,揭示制造企业和客户之间的行为方式,构建考虑两者行为的交互演化博弈模型,分析了不同情形下的模型均衡点及其稳定性.并采用matlab数值实验方法研究直观表现参数变动对演化结果的影响.研究结果表明：制造业服务化过程中易形成知识缺口,而企业的服务化程度、客户的参与程度、服务化所形成的差额收益会对制造企业与客户基于知识的交互产生影响,需要对知识缺口进行补救.
英文摘要：
The process of servitization of manufacturing strategy is bound to produce the interaction of supply and demand sides, while, because of the information asymmetry, they will generate knowledge gaps. The paper constructs interaction evolutionary game model to reveal the behaviors between manufacturers and customers, then analysis the equilibrium and stability under different scenarios. Results are shown that in the process of implementing knowledge gaps in manufacturing services, the degree of the enterprise servitization, the degree of the customer involvement and the extract income will have an impact on manufacturing service based on knowledge of the interaction with the customer,which need to be implemented.
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