中文摘要：

本文以2008-2011年民营上市公司为样本，将内部控制明确划分为执行力度和执行有效性两个维度，在此基础上，考察了CEO的政治关联对企业内部控制执行的影响机理。研究发现，在政府主导内部控制建设的发展模式下，民营上市公司CEO的政治关联确实提高了企业内部控制的执行力度，但是，内部控制执行力度大并不代表内部控制执行更有效；进一步，基于“政府干预”理论和“关系”理论，将政治关联区分为官员型和代表委员型两大类，发现只有当公司CEO具有代表委员型政治关联时，其内部控制执行才有效。故，民营上市公司政治关联是影响其内部控制执行的关键，其内部控制执行有效性又是公司在迎合政府要求与提升自我管控能力的真实需求之间做出理性选择的结果。本文的研究立足于经济社会转型期中国的现实情境，不仅拓展了基于制度背景从政治关联视角考察企业内部控制的研究领域，为企业主体辩证看待政治关联的作用和转变对内部控制的观念提供了新的认知；而且为政府在推动微观层面的制度建设中实现职能转变提供了现实依据。

英文摘要：

Using the 2008--2011 data of private listed firms, we divide the internal control implementation into two dimensions： internal control enforcement and internal control effectiveness, and investigate the mechanism of how CEOs＇ political connections affect internal control implementation. We find that, in the situation where government takes the lead in internal control construction, CEOs＇ political connections significantly enhance internal control enforcement in private listed firms. However, greater internal control enforcement does not necessarily lead to higher effectiveness. Further, based on the ＂government intervention＂ view and the ＂relationship＂ view, CEOs can be categorized into ＂government officials＂ and ＂members of People＇s Congress （PC） and Chinese People＇s Political Consultative Conference （CPPCC）＂. Only CEOs titled with ＂members of PC and CPPCC＂ can implement internal control effectively. Our results show that CEO＇s political connection is the key to internal control implementation. The effectiveness of internal control implementation is a trade-off choice weighting between complying with governmental requirements and improving self-control capacity. This study contributes to internal control literature regarding the role played by political connections.