中文摘要：

基于委托代理理论分析不对称信息下供应商占主导地位的合同设计问题。占主导地位的供应商以一定的价格向制造商供货,制造商对产品再次加工并对外销售,供应商需要确定对制造商的销售价格和制造商所付的转移支付来获得最大化收益。建立了占主导地位的供应商期望收益最大化的委托代理模型,通过分析模型的目标函数、激励相容约束和参与约束,得到了最优的销售价格和转移支付。结果表明随着制造商再制造成本的递增,供应商的销售价格增加,而制造商所付的转移支付递减。最后通过数值算例验证模型的可行性。

英文摘要：

A contract for the dominant supplier with asymmetric information is designed and analyzed in this paper.The products are sold to a manufacturer by the dominant supplier and reprocessed and sold by the manufacturer.The dominant supplier has to determine the sale price and the transfer payment from the manufacturer.Then a principal-agent model is established to maximize the profit of the supplier,and the sale price and the transfer payment can be obtained through the analysis of the objective function,the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint.The sale price of the dominant supplier is rising with the increase of the reprocessed cost of the manufacturer,while the transfer payment from the manufacturer is decreasing.Finally,a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.