基于现阶段我国海洋灾害保险现状及存在的问题,在剖析国内外相关经验的基础上,以联盟博弈为分析工具,分析海洋灾害保险潜在参与者政府、商业性保险公司、投保人三者间的利益份额,得出各参与者的核和稳定解Shapley值。据此,探讨我国海洋灾害保险的合理模式,为建立科学的海洋灾害保险机制提供理论参考。
Taking marine disaster insurance as research objects, the paper studied therelated experiences of both at home and abroad. Using alliance game, it measured thebenefit shares in the potential marine disaster insurance participants of the government,commercial insurance company and policy-holder, and acquired the nucleus and stableShapley of three participants. As a result, the article discussed the reasonable model forthe marine disaster insurance in China, so as to provide theoretical basis for a scientificdisaster insurance mechanism.