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中文摘要：
为了弥补以往有关供应链期权契约的研究都假设产品销售价格是固定的，没有考虑到产品价格的变动以及对随机需求的影响，研究了价格敏感型随机需求下供应链期权契约的设计问题，基于主从博弈理论，通过建立契约模型，给出了期权购买价格和执行价格的最优设定规则，即：可利用单变量最优化理论，利用一维授学算法求最优销售价格。通过一个数值例子验证了契约的有效性，此契约机制不仅可以实现系统的协调，还可以实现系统收益在制造商和销售商问的任意分配。
英文摘要：
In order to make up for the deficiency of the literature about supply chain option contracts, which all assumed the retail price is fixed and neglects the change in price and its impacts on the stochastic demand, the option contract mechanism is investigated in this supply chain setting. Based on the theory of leader-follower game, the optimal pricing strategies for the option are provided. Finally, the validity of the option contract mechanism is illustrated by a numerical example. The option contract not only coordinates the supply chain also can divide arbitrarily the profit between the manufacturer and the retailer.
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