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财权配置、控制权私利与外部治理
  • ISSN号:1671-6477
  • 期刊名称:《武汉理工大学学报:社会科学版》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F275[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430081
  • 相关基金:教育部人文社会科学研究项目“我国上市公司恶意再融资研究”(08JC630061)
作者: 黎精明[1]
中文摘要:

从理论上探究了导致控制权私利现象的原因,并对财权配置、控制权私利和外部治理的关系进行了实证检验,研究发现,控制权私利现象源于财权的不合理配置,对称、集中和制衡的财权安排有利于减缓甚至消除控制权私利现象,外部治理在抑制控制权私利的同时也降低了企业的财务运行效率,是一种以效率换公平的交易行为。

英文摘要:

Within the research frameworks of corporate governance theories,the problem of private benefits of control is one of the important aspects,and the mainstream views tend to use outer governance strategies to resolve it.Starting with a theoretical analysis,the paper explores deep-seated causes to the phenomenon of private benefits of control,and based on Chinese capital market data,the paper systematically tests the mutual relations between financial rights arrangements,private benefits of control and outer governance,then comes up with views and ideas for the problems of generation and governance strategies of private benefits of control. It's found that the phenomenon of private benefits of control is generated from the irrational arrangements of financial rights, on the contrary, symmetrical,focused and restricted arrangements of financial rights are conducive to slow down or even eliminate the phenomenon of private benefits of control,and outer governance also reduces the efficiency of the financial operation during suppressing private benefits of control, thus, it is some kind of transactions from efficiency to fairness.

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期刊信息
  • 《武汉理工大学学报:社会科学版》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:中华人民共和国教育部
  • 主办单位:武汉理工大学
  • 主编:王威孚
  • 地址:武汉市武昌区和平大道1178号
  • 邮编:430063
  • 邮箱:wgh6612@163.com
  • 电话:027-86553823 86557005 86551152
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1671-6477
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:42-1660/C
  • 邮发代号:38-74
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 美国剑桥科学文摘,中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库
  • 被引量:7002