中文摘要：

本文分别从控股股东与非控股大股东的绩效函数出发，建立股权制衡的公司治理绩效模型，用以分析控股股东利益侵占和公司股权制衡的作用关系。研究发现：一方面，公司股权制衡受到控股股东侵占行为的操纵，表现为控股股东侵占对股权制衡的正向作用；另一方面，股权制衡能够提升公司治理绩效，表现为股权制衡对控股股东侵占的负向影响。另外，非控股大股东具有与控股股东相互合谋的动机，以实现对公司中小股东利益的联合侵占。

英文摘要：

We construct a model about the corporate governance performance of shareholders balance mechanism （ short as SBM ） to analyze the relationship between SBM and controlling shareholder ＇ s tunneling behaviors. From the performance functions of controlling and non - control large shareholders, our mathematical research finds out corporate SBM is manipulated by the tunneling of controlling shareholder on one hand, which shows that the controlling shareholder＇ s tunneling has positive effect on corporate SBM; and on the other hand, corporate governance performance is improved by SBM, which is manifested by the negative influence of corporate SBM on controlling shareholder＇ s tunneling. Furthermore, there is probability of collusion between controlling and non - control large shareholders so as to achieve the joint expropriation of the interests of minority shareholders.