中文摘要：

本文关注了管理者过度自信对公司成本粘性的影响。过度自信的管理者会高估未来的现金流,低估未来的风险,而导致公司较高的成本粘性。以2001-2011年沪深两市A股非国有制造类上市公司为研究样本,本文展开实证检验,发现：（1）管理者过度自信的公司,其成本粘性显著更高;（2）这一关系仅存在于债务约束较弱的情况下,债务约束较强时,管理者过度自信并不会显著提高公司成本粘性;（3）区分债务来源、银行贷款债务与其他债务对管理者过度自信与成本粘性的关系都能起到较好的约束作用;区分债务期限、长期债务与短期债务均有较好的约束作用,且短期债务的约束效果更佳。文章从宏观景气指数、管理者相对薪酬、管理者持股变化等不同方面衡量管理者过度自信,得到的证据一致。本文的发现揭示了管理者过度自信对公司成本性态的影响,也显示了债务约束的积极治理效应。

英文摘要：

Overconfidence is an important and interesting issue in psychology, economics and management fields. This paper focuses on the effects of manager＇s overconfidence on cost stickiness of com- panies in China. Managers who are overconfident may have tendency to overestimate cash flow and underestimate the risk of future. So even the activity of the company falls, they are unwilling to adjust their former strategy and cut recourses, and it will lead the cost stick- iness of the company to be high. Taking Chinese industry non-SOEs listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2001 to 2011 as the research sample, this paper did empirical tests on the inference. The empirical results show that： （1） Cost stickiness was higher in compa- nies with overconfident managers, which is consistent with the pre- diction; （2） If considering the debt constraints, the above relation only existed under situations where the debt constraints were weak. If the company was under strong debt constraints, the above relation disap- peared; （3） If considering the source of debt, both bank loan and other debt had good governance effect to cost stickiness; if considering the term of debt, both long term and short term loan had good gov- ernance effect to cost stickiness, and the governance effect of short term debt to cost stickiness was even better in some sense. These re- suits were stable under several different measurements of managers＇ overconfidence following former references, such as business climate index, relative pay, and change of managers＇ shares and several other robust checks. The above findings not only show the positive effect of manager＇s overconfidence on cost stickiness of the company, but also indicate the good governance effects of debts to cost stickiness. Overall, this paper supports the optimism theory of cost stickiness from angles of both incentive and ability in China, which may be en- lightening to future studies of this field.