中文摘要：

外部投资者利益的保护程度取决于发现和惩罚公司内部人转移或掠夺公司现金流量的行为。我们主要研究完全竞争市场中自利的独立审计师在投资者保护中所扮演的角色，即独立审计师负责监督查处公司内部人（企业家）转移或掠夺公司现金流量的行为。结果发现，独立审计师因审计失败遭受的边际惩罚支出越大，企业家因转移或掠夺公司现金流量被查处遭到的边际惩罚支出越大，公司治理结构越完善，那么项目投资额越高，外部投资者持有的现金流量比例越高，企业家的预期报酬也都越高。

英文摘要：

Protection of outside investors depends on the detection and punishment of resource diversion by managers or controlling shareholders. We focus on the role played in investor protection by self-interested auditors operating in a competitive audit market. In our setting, auditors represent the mechanism whereby detection of diversion occurs. We show that markets with relatively greater auditor penalties for audit failures, better gov- ernance mechanism for corporations and greater insider（entrepreneur） penalties for detected resource diversion have larger total investment levels, a higher proportion of the firm held by outsiders, higher audit effort, higher audit fees, and higher expected payoffs for insiders.